37 ideas
| 8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
| 8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
| 8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
| 8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
| 10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
| 8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
| 8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
| 8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
| 8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
| 10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
| 8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
| 10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| 10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
| 10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
| 10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
| 8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
| 10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
| 10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
| 10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
| 10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
| 10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
| 10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
| 10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
| 10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
| 10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| 8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
| 8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
| 10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |